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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
apparent conflict between the Finstad and Allis-Chalmers cases was
ignored. In the latter case the facts were similar to the Smith case,
and the agreement provided that upon default the vendor "... may
pursue all legal remedies to enforce payment hereunder, but if unable
to collect may thereafter repossess the property." The agreement also
provided that title was to remain in the vendor until full payment had
been made. The court in the Allis-Chalmers case stated that a vendor
had merely an election of remedies and could not provide himself
with both. The court then held that the provision which allowed the
vendor to repossess the property if he should be unable to collect must
be stricken from the agreement. The apparent conflict between the
Allis-Chalmers and Finstad cases lies in the court's approach to the
interpretation problem. In the Allis-Chalmers case the vendor, by
stating cumulative remedies, attempted to stipulate a remedy which
was not available under a conditional sales contract. However, in the
Finstad case the court interpreted the remedies clause as expressing
the intent of the parties to pass title to the vendee.
The result of Smith v. Downs appears to be another implied over-
ruling of the Allis-Chalmers case. The Finstad case appears to be
immune from attack.
AlTHuR R. HART
CRIMINAL LAW
Appeal-Preservation of Grounds-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney. In State v. Case' defendant appealed from a conviction
of carnal knowledge, assigning as error a claim that he had been denied
a fair trial because of improper and prejudicial argument by the prose-
cuting attorney. No objections, motions to strike, or instructions to
disregard the remarks of the state's counsel had been made during the
trial, nor did the defendant move for a new trial. On appeal the supreme
court found that the prosecuting attorney had gone beyond the bounds
of proper argument by asserting his personal belief in the guilt of the
accused, by referring to the accused's "herd" of witnesses, and by
making further prejudicial remarks in his closing argument to the jury.
The court, on its own motion, granted a new trial, notwithstanding de-
fendant's failure to preserve the record.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 71, 298 P2d 500 (1956). This was a 7-2 decision. The dissenting
judges, Ott and Mallery, disagreed with the majority's finding that the prosecuting
attorney had made improper and prejudicial argument. They also felt that, even if
there had been improper argument, defendant's failure to raise the question at the trial
level precluded him from raising the question on appeal.
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The court emphasized that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed by
the state constitution, 2 and that the prosecuting attorney, a quasi-
judicial officer, must so conduct himself as not to infringe upon that
right. While recognizing that misconduct in the form of improper argu-
ment is not ordinarily grounds for appeal, unless called to the attention
of the trial judge for correction or ruling, the court stated that this
rule is not to be followed in criminal cases where the misconduct of
the prosecuting attorney has been "so flagrant that no instruction would
cure it."' If the remarks are so prejudicial that they cannot be cured
by instruction, reasoned the court, there is, in effect, a mistrial. If
defendant's counsel and the trial judge fail to take proper action to
protect the right of the accused to a fair trial, then the appellate court
must, in the interests of justice, take it upon itself to grant a new trial.
A great number of cases have stated that the supreme court has the
power to pass on an allegation of flagrant misconduct of a prosecuting
attorney where the defendant has failed to object or request that the
trial judge give instructions to the jury to disregard the improper re-
marks.4 In none of these cases, however, did the court expressly con-
sider the need for raising the question on a motion for new trial. In
holding that a failure to raise the question by motion for new trial does
not waive the right to raise the matter on appeal, the court has repudi-
ated strong language in State v. Davis,' a recent case involving some-
what similar facts. In that case the defendant claimed upon appeal,
and without objection during trial or by motion for new trial, that
the trial judge had commented on the evidence by his leading ques-
tions of the defendant.' In the Davis case the court said that although
the defendant was excused from making objections, motions to strike,
and requests for instructions to disregard the trial judge's remarks,
he was not excused from raising the question on a motion for a new
trial.' Said the court,
- While the right to a fair trail is not expressly mentioned in the constitution, the
section which guarantees a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 22, is held to a guarantee a fair trial. State v. Case, Mipra note 1.
3 149 Wash. Dec. at 78, 298 P2d at 505.
4 State v. Meyercamp, 82 Wash. 607, 144 Pac. 942 (1914), was the first Washington
case to announce this principle. Later cases are collected in State v. Case, 149 Wash.
Dec. 71, 298 P.2d 500 (1956).
G41 Wn.2d 535, 250 P.2d 548 (1952).
O The cases present somewhat similar facts, in that both involve remarks by an
officer of the court which allegedly violate a constitutional right of the accused. As to
constitutional protection of right to fair trial, see note 2 supra; as to the provision that
trial judge shall not comment upon the evidence, see WASH. CoNST. art. IV, § 16.
' The court's reasoning in waiving the requirement of objection during the trial
was that objection to the trial judge's conduct might prejudice counsel in the eyes of
the jury.
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"This is but a corollary to the rule that questions not raised in any
manner before the lower court will not be considered on appeal."8
The court in State v. Case distinguished the Davis case case by point-
ing out that in that case there was no allegation that the trial judge's
comments were so prejudicial that they could not have been cured by an
instruction.
A reading of statutory provisions and court rules on appellate pro-
cedure would indicate that the supreme court's power of review is
restricted to correcting errors of the trial court in its disposition of
questions properly laid before it.9 There exists however, in addition
to cases involving flagrant misconduct of a prosecuting attorney, a
group of criminal cases in which the supreme court has considered
claims of error upon grounds not adequately preserved in the lower
court. In State v. Marsh0 the defendant was allowed to show on
appeal that he had not been granted a public trial, as guaranteed by
the State Constitution. State v. Crotts" was the first of several cases'
in which the claim of error was that the trial judge had made adverse
comments on the evidence, in violation of the State Constitution. In
Friedrick v. Territory," the error claimed on appeal was that the
defendant had not been given a fair and impartial trial because the
trial judge's jury charge was an argument on the facts. In all of these
cases, after considering defendant's claim of error on the merits not-
withstanding his failure to preserve the record, the supreme court
granted new trials.
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have likewise declared their
power to consider, in criminal cases, error not properly preserved or
8 41 Wn2d at 537, 250 P.2d at 549.
9 See dissenting opinion by Ott, J., in State v. Case, 149 Wash. Dec. at 81, 298 P.2d
at 506; R.C.W. 2.04.180-200; Rule on Appeal 1, 34A Wn.2d 15; Rule on Appeal 14,
34A Wn.2d 20; Rule on Appeal 17, 34A Wn.2d 24.
LO 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923).
1122 Wash. 245, 60 Pac. 403 (1900).
12 State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 Pac. 470 (1915); State v. Warwick, 105
Wash. 634, 178 Pac. 977 (1919). It must be pointed out that State v. Davis, 41 Wn.2d
535, 250 P.2d 548 (1952), also involved comments on the evidence by the trial judge.
Prior to the Davis case the court emphasized that the invasion of a constitutional
right and improper conduct by a trial judge gave sufficient justification for considering
the claimed error on appeal. In none of those earlier cases did the court stipulate that
the question must have been raised in some manner in the lower court. The Davis case
seemingly limits the principle developed in the earlier cases to waiver of objection
during the trial, stressing a different line of reasoning. See note 7 supra. However,
the court in State v. Case has chipped away at this limitation by indicating that,
even on the Davis facts, if there is a claim that the trial judge's comments were so
prejudicial that right to a fair trial has been impaired, the matter will be considered
on appeal despite failure to raise the question at the trial level.
Is2 Wash. 358, 26 Pac. 976 (1891).
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not raised at all in the lower court in these same situations ' and in cases
involving double jeopardy,"5 incompetency of defendant's counsel, 6
improper admission of evidence, 7 and failure to request an instruction
to acquit.18
Common to all of these cases is the element that the error assigned,
if substantial, would amount to a denial of the fundamental right of the
accused to a fair trial. If the appellate court is to rule that the defend-
ant cannot raise these questions on appeal merely because his counsel
has not taken the proper procedural steps to preserve error, then the
appellate court is denying to the accused his full measure of rights.
Some would say that refusal to allow the defendant to raise these
questions is the proper result; that the defendant has not been denied
these rights at all, but has waived them by not complying with the
procedural rules." While such an answer is acceptable when applied
to civil actions, -21 it is not convincing in criminal cases, where the
interests at stake are the freedom or, in capital cases,' the life of the
accused. To uphold a conviction where the defendant has not had a
fair trial because of flagrantly improper remarks of the prosecuting
attorney, or where the defendant's rights have been prejudiced by
counsel's failure to make timely objections or motions, would be to
place a higher premium on compliance with procedural rules than is
placed on reaching a just result.
The court's holding in State v. Case, when it is remembered that the
court had before it an exceptional case, is consistent with the very
14 Misconduct of prosecuting attorney: State v. Washelesky, 81 Conn. 22, 70 Atl.
62 (1908) ; City of Prescott v. Sumid, 30 Ariz. 347, 247 Pac. 122 (1926) ; People v.
Simon, 80 Cal. App. 675, 252 Pac. 758 (1927) ; People v. Ford, 89 Cal. App. 2d 467,
200 P.2d 867 (1949). These cases apply the same test as in State v. Case, i.e., whether
the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney is so flagrant and prejudicial that no
instruction or admonition could cure it.
Misconduct of trial judge: People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280, 203 Pac. 440
(1921). Right to public trial: State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906).
15 Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 189 N.W. 270 (1922).
1" Lloyd v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 130, 175 Pac. 374 (1918). It might be noted that
the attorneys prosecuting the appeal in State v. Case, supra, did not represent the
defendant in the trial of the case. Numerous references were made, in the defendant's
appellate brief, to the trial counsel's inexperience and to the prosecuting attorney's
taking advantage of this lack of experience. Pages 20, 33, 34, Brief of Appellant.
27 Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P2d 71 (1934).
18 State v. Garcia, 19 N.Mex. 414, 143 Pac. 1012 (1912).
I0 See Fisher v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 623, 2 S.W.2d 249 (1927).
21) Among the reasons commonly given are: that such a rule is necessary to the
orderly and prompt administration of justice; that the error might have been cured if
objection had been taken; that any other rule would give the appellant a chance to
conceal errors at the trial, and then bring them up on review in order to prolong
litigation. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Propcrly Raised And Preserved; 7 Wxs. L. Rnv. 91 (1932).
21 See State v. Bailey, 147 Wash. 411, 266 Pac. 163 (1928).
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evident proposition that
"the purpose of judicial systems is to administer justice. Standards [of
procedure] are a means to an end; not an end in themselves." 22
If an appellate court is strongly convinced that the defendant in a
criminal action was not properly convicted, then it should grant a
new trial despite procedural failures made by the defendant.
STANLEY M. JOHANSON
Habeas Corpus-Attack of Illegal Sentence Where Petitioner Does Not Seek
Release From Confinement. In In re Nahl v. Delmore, 149 Wash. Dec. 313, 301
P2d 161 (1956), petitioner had pleaded guilty to and was convicted on a charge of
second degree assault. He was subsequently transferred from the state penitentiary to
Eastern State Hospital for the insane. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed on behalf of the petitioner, the petition alleging that petitioner's plea of guilty was
the result of coercion and duress, and that petitioner's constitutional rights had thereby
been violated. Held, petition transmitted to a superior court for a determination of
of the facts, as to the allegations of coercion and duress. The fact that petitioner was
confined in a mental hospital and that a granting of the writ would not result in a
release from confinement did not make academic the question raised by the petition.
Petitioner was entitled to a hearing in order to determine the issues of fact raised. If
his allegations are found to be true, then the unlawful conviction and sentence shall
be set aside. Under RCW 7.36.130(1), as amended in 1947, if the petitioner alleges a
violation of rights guaranteed by the State or Federal Constitution, he is entitled to
have his petition heard even though the result sought from the hearing is not a
release from confinement.
The court cited and followed In re Palmer v. Cranor, 45 Wn2d 278, 273 P.2d 985
(1954), noted in 30 Wash. L. Rev. 123 (1955). In the Palmer case the petitioner, law-
fully incarcerated under one sentence, challenged the validity of a second sentence on
grounds of duress, alleging a violation of constitutional rights. The court ordered a
hearing on the issues of fact raised.
Earlier in 1956 the same judges who decided the Nahl case ruled, in It re Ashley v.
Delmore, 149 Wash. Dec. 1, 297 P.2d 958 (1956), that a writ of habeas corpus would
not issue to test the validity of a sentence at a time when the petitioner was lawfully
incarcerated under an earlier and undisputed sentence. Petitioner had been convicted
of forgery and was sentenced to a term of twenty years. He escaped from jail, was
subsequently recaptured, and was sentenced to an additional term of twenty years.
Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the twenty-
year sentence for escaping jail. Petitioner's application was based on an interpreta-
tion of the sentencing statutes which would make ten years the maximum allowable
sentence for violation of the statute related to escaping jail. The court, in denying
the writ, said in effect that the question raised by petitioner was academic at that
time inasmuch as he was confined under a valid and undisputed sentence.
On the surface, the court's holding in the Ashley case seems in conflict with the Nahl
case and the Palmer case. In the Ashley case the court stated that the petitioner's
lawful confinement precluded any inquiry into the questions raised by his application
for the writ; in the other two cases the court ordered a hearing to settle the questions
22 Campbell, Extent To Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not
Properly Raised And Preserved, 8 Wis. L. Rxv. 172 (1933).
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raised despite petitioner's undisputed confinement. The conclusions reached are justi-
fiable, however. First, and probably most important, there was no attempt made in
the Ashley case to bring the petition within the liberalizing framework of the 1947
amendment of the habeas corpus statute. Petitioner did not allege a violation of his
constitutional rights. Indeed, his challenge was not on constitutional grounds at all,
but rather was on a claim of misapplication of sentencing statutes. Second, the peti-
tioner sought, in the Ashley case, the determination of an issue of law; in the Nahi
and Palmer cases the petitioner raised an issue of fact. Where the question raised is
one of fact, the dangers of postponement until the end of the valid sentence are that
"witnesses move away; evidence disappears; memories grow dim." In re Palmer v.
Cranor, 45 Wn.2d at 285, 273 P.2d at 990. No such problems necessitate an immediate
hearing where the question raises a point of law.
Finally, it must be pointed out that although the supreme court turned down the
application for a writ in the Ashley case the petitioner did not go away empty-handed.
In an interesting "asides" remark to the attorney general, the court concluded its
opinion by stating that "The attorney general, having conceded that there may be
some merit to the petitioner's contention that his sentence ... should be ten instead of
twenty years, will, we are sure, co-operate with him in working out a inodus operandi
for a speedy determination of that issue." 149 Wash. Dec. at 5, 297 P.2d at 960.
The cases of In re Nahl v. Delmore and it re Ashley v. Dehnore, decided in 1956,
serve to illustrate the liberal attitude that our supreme court holds toward the purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus in Washington.
Exclusive Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Over Crimes Committed By Indians.
In In re Andy, 149 Wash. Dec. 437, 302 P.2d 963 (1956), the petitioner had been con-
victed of burglary. The crime was committed on land which was within the boundaries
of the Yakima Indian reservation but which had been patented in fee to a non-Indian.
Petitioner, a quarter-blood Indian, applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
the superior court in which he was tried had no jurisdiction. Held, petition granted.
The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over an unemancipated Indian who
is alleged to have committed murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent
to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery and larceny within
"Indian country." Indian country includes any land within the boundaries of an Indian
reservation. Ownership of the land by a non-Indian does not affect the federal govern-
ment's exclusive jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153, 3242 (1952).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The Right of Contribution Between Parents for the Support of Their Minor
Children. In Scott v. Holcomb, 149 Wash. Dec. 377, 301 P2d 1068 (1956), the
Washington Court, on the basis of RCW 26.26.010, held that a father who has cared for
four of five minor children of the parties in the absence of any provision in the divorce
decree, is entitled to a set-off in an action brought by the mother on a judgment for
contribution for the support of the fifth minor child of the parties.
The father and mother, residing in New York, separated in 1934 with the father
leaving the home of the parties, taking with him the four oldest children and a
woman who later became his wife. The four children resided with the father and
were supported by him until they reached majority. In 1940 the mother obtained a
divorce on the ground that her husband had absented himself for more than five
years and was thought to be dead. In 1949 the father returned to New York to attend
the funeral of his son and was served to defend an action brought by his former wife
to recover contribution for the support of the child who had remained with the mother.
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